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Dimensions of Confusion:
Recent Supreme Court
Decisions on Double
Jeopardy
by David Hanley
On June 14, 1978, the Supreme Court handed down
the following opinions: Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 98 S. Ct. 2141,57 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1978), Greene v. Massey,
437 U.S. 19,98 S.Ct.2151, 57 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1978), Christy.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed. 2d 24 (1978),
Sanabriav. United States, 437 U.S. 54,98 S.Ct. 2170,57
L.Ed. 2d 43 (1978), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed. 2d 65 (1978). There has been a
great deal of confusion in the double jeopardy area of
constitutional criminal procedure as can be seen by the
number of opinions involved here. These five opinions
may be helpful to courts in interpreting the breadth and
scope of the Fifth Amendment provision that "no person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Basically, the confusion is a result of the Court's
engrafting several distinct doctrines onto the common
law understanding of former jeopardy and placing them
under the heading of double jeopardy. The doctrines
which the Court has coalesced with former jeopardy to
form the law of double jeopardy are those of retrial after
mistrial, multiple prosecution, and collateral estoppel.
In England, there were four pleas in bar to the bringing
of a criminal action against a defendant. These four pleas
were known as autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, autrefois attaint, and former pardon. When the colonies
adopted the common law of England, they adopted the
pleas in bar. Only the first two, however, seemed to have
made it across the Atlantic. Former jeopardy fell into disuse and autrefois attaint was not necessary since the
Constitution of the United States did not permit the use
of bills of attainder. See, Note, Twice in Jeopardy 75 Yale
L.J. 262 (1965), Footnote 1.
Autrefois acquit and autrefois convict constitute the
common law understanding of former jeopardy in the
United States. The basis of these pleas is that once a person has gone through a complete trial on a charge and
there is a final outcome of either acquittal or conviction,
he can not be brought to trial again for that same charge.
Autrefois acquit bars a subsequent trial if there has been
an acquittal. Autrefois convict bars subsequent trial if
there has been a former conviction.
Rarely will the State attempt to retry a man for the
same offense after there has been a previous trial resulting in an acquittal or a conviction. It may be, however,
that the State feels that an acquittal was obtained by

error and wishes to take an appeal from the decision. A
problem is presented whenever there is an appeal after a
final verdict of guilt or innocence in the lower court.
As noted in Scott, the United States has had no right of
appeal in a criminal case absent explicit statutory authority. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, (1892). Not
until 1907 was statutory authority provided for appeals in
a criminal matter. In 1971, Congress adopted legislation
permitting appeals by the government from any decision
dismissing an indictment, "except that no appeal shall lie
where the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits further prosecution." 18 U.S.C.
§3731. United States v. Scott, supra at 85.
Sanabria u. United States involves an appeal by the
government from an acquittal in the lower court. In this
case, the petitioner had been indicted for violating 18
U.S.C. §1955 (a) which makes it an offense to conduct an
"illegal gambling business." §1955 (b) defines illegal gainbling business as one which is in violation of state law in
the state in which it is operated. The government alleged
that the defendants' activities of horse betting and
numbers betting were in violation of Massachusetts state
law.
The government's evidence showed that the petitioner was involved in both horse betting and numbers
betting. After the defendants rested, however, the trial
judge granted a motion to exclude the numbers betting
evidence because the government had relied on the
wrong statute for that charge. At the close of the case,
the trial judge granted petitioner's motion for judgment
of acquittal since the evidence was insufficient on the
other charge. From this rulling, the government took an
appeal pursuant to §3731.
Justice Marshall frames the issue in terms of "whether
the United States may appeal in a criminal case from a
midtrial ruling resulting in the exclusion of certain evidence and from a subsequently entered judgment of
acquittal." Sanabria,supra at 56. But this framing of the
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issue is too simple. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S.
141, 143 (1962) makes it clear that no matter how egregiously erroneous the legal rulings leading to the judgment of acquittal might be, there is no exception to the
constitutional rule forbidding successive trials for the
same offense. The court's conclusion reaffirmed this
rule.
The government, however, argued that the numbers
betting and horse betting theories were distinct bases of
liability. They contend that by granting the defendants'
motion to exclude the numbers betting evidence, the
court dismissed that theory and thus a new trial would
not twice put the defendant in jeopardy for the same
offense. In other words, although the defendant has been
acquitted on the horse betting theory, the government
contends he had not been tried on the numbers betting
theory.
Since the two theories were not placed in separate
counts in the charging document, the Court feels that
they can not be maintained as distinct bases of liability.
Besides, the Court feels that if there were two possible
theories for violating §1955, Congress would have
expressed them in the statute. The statute only provides
for one basis of liability on the theory of conducting an
illegal gambling business. Petitioner has been tried on
that charge and acquitted. Any retrial of petitioner would
be for the same offense of conducting an illegal gambling
business. The Court concludes that although the
numbers evidence was erroneously excluded, under
Fong Foo, the judgment of acquittal was final and unreviewable. Sanabria, supra at 77.
If an appeal from an acquittal is not allowed under
§3731 because it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause,
then what constitutes an acquittal? This is the question
which the Court asked in United States v. Scott, supra.
Does any dismissal pronounced by the trial judge constitute an acquittal and thus a bar to appeal and subsequent
retrial? The Court found in Scott that not all dismissals
bar appeals. Only a dismissal based on the merits of the
case would bar any appeal.
In Scott, the defendant who was indicted for distributing narcotics, twice moved during the trial to have two
counts dismissed on the grounds that his defense had
been prejudiced by a preindictment delay. At the close of
all the evidence, the court granted the defendant's
motion. The United States appealed and the defendant
relied upon United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)
to bar such appeal. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit concluded that any further prosecution would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to give further consideration to the problem of a
governmental appeal from a dismissal.
Jenkins held that whether or not a dismissal of an

indictment after jeopardy had attached amounted to an
acquittal on the merits, the government had no right to
appeal. The rationale given by Justice Rehnquist in Jenkins barring an appeal was that "further proceedings of
some sort devoted to the resolution of factual issues
going to the elements of the offense charged, would have
been required upon reversal and remand." Justice Rehnquist in an unprecedented move overruled the opinion
he wrote in Jenkins. Scott supra at 101. He relates that
the court's decision in Jenkins was based upon the perception that the state with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense." Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). Rehnquist, however
states:
Upon fuller consideration, we are now of the view
that this language from Green, while entirely appropriate in the circumstances of this opinion, is not a principle which can be expanded to include situations in
which the defendant is responsible for the second
prosecution. Scott, supra at 95.
In Scott, the defendant sought termination of the trial on
grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence.
Finally, Rehnquist concludes by stating that:
Here "the lessons of experience" indicate that
Government appeals from mid-trial dismissals
requested by the defendant would significantly
advance the public interest in assuring that each
defendant shall be subject to a just judgment on the
merits of his case, without enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green, supra at 188. Accordingly, the contrary holding of United States v. Jenkins is overruled. Scott,
supra at 101.
Justice Brennan writes a very strong dissent joined
in by Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens. He feels
that the ruling of the majority will be difficult to apply.
In contrast, the Jenkins rule was much easier to apply.
The question for many state and federal judges will be
"which dismissals bar appeal?" It is the opinion of the
minority that "only confusion can result from today's
decision." Scott, supra at 103.
Sanabria and Scott both dealt with government
appeals from a favorable judgment for the defendant.
Suppose, however, the defendant successfully appeals
from a judgment for the State, that is, a verdict of guilty.
Can the appellate court remand for a new trial upon finding error in the decisions of the trial judge? This is the
question which the court asks in Burks and Greene.
Burks discusses the history of the law in this area.
Prior to Burks, whether a.new trial could be granted
depended on two factors. The first factor is whether the
defendant made a motion for a new trial at the trial court
before taking his appeal. Justice Douglas felt that a rever-

sal in an appellate court for lack of evidence was equivalent to a judgment of acquittal and should bar subsequent
trial. Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 321 (1955).
However, the concurring opinion in Sapir points out that
the court's decision would have been different had the
petitioner asked for a new trial. It is a fundamental principle of double jeopardy law that where a person's conviction is set aside by his appeal, he can be tried a second
time for the same offense. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662 (1891).
The other factor to be considered is whether the reversal was based on trial error as opposed to evidentiary
insufficiency. If there is trial error, then a remand for new
trial will not hurt the defendant and must be balanced
against society's interest in punishing the guilty. Chief
Justice Burger in an opinion joined by all of the members
of the Court participating stated that:
In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished
from evidentiary insufficiency does not constitute a
decision to the effect that the government has failed to
prove its case. As such it implies nothing with respect
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is
a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some

fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has
a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of
his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a
valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.
Burks, supra at p. 15.
On the other hand, a reversal based on the insufficiency
of evidence is equivalent to the trial judge saying the
Government's evidence was so lacking that the case
should not be submitted to the jury. Thus, the trial judge
would grant a judgment of acquittal for the defendant.
Prior to Burks, the first factor mentioned was the most
significant in deciding whether a new trial could be had
after a reversal by the appellate court. Often, the second
factor was not even considered by the courts. However,
Burks makes it clear that the reverse consideration must
be made now. The distinction between a reversal based
on legally insufficient evidence and trial error will be the
decisive factor. Chief Justice Burger holds that "once the
reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only just remedy available for the court is the
direction of a judgment of acquittal," which will bar any
retrial. Burks, supra at 18.
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In Greene v. Massey, Chief Justice Burger simply
stated that the rule enunciated in Burks would be applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy in the
Fifth Amendment is fully applicable to the states. Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1967). This means that every
decision interpreting the constitutional meaning of the
double jeopardy clause applies to the states as well as the
federal government. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Powell expressed disagreement with the court's conclusion that the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy was fully applicable to state criminal proceedings.
Richard Austin Greene appealed his conviction of
first-degree murder to the Supreme Court of Florida.
The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new
trial holding that the evidence did not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder
in the first degree. However, three of the four judges
deciding the case filed a concurring opinion in which they
stated the trial should be remanded for a new trial
because of trial error. At the second trial, the defendant
was again convicted of first-degree murder after unsuccessfully contending the second trial was barred under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. His argument was taken
into the federal courts by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme
Court of Florida to make a determination in light of
Burks u. United States as to whether the reversal constituted an acquittal because it was based on insufficient
evidence or that the reversal was based on trial error.
At this juncture, Mandel u. United Statespresents the
opportunity for much speculation. Governor Marvin
Mandel was convicted of several charges of mail fraud
and racketeering in the United States District Court of

Maryland. Upon appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, there was a reversal and
remand for a new trial based on 28 U.S.C. 2106 which
gives the government broad powers to remand. On
remand, the defense would naturally want to raise the
issue that a new trial for the same offense is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
If this issue were raised, the court would have to base
its decision on the analysis established in Burks. Thus,
the ultimate question is whether the reversal was based
on trial error or the insufficiency of the evidence produced. A reversal was granted on the grounds that inadmissible hearsay evidence was admitted to prove the
essential part of the government's case. In its opinion,
the court states "we do not reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as to any individual case or
count, or as to the case taken as a whole." Excerpts of
Mandel Decision, The Baltimore Evening Sun, Vol. 284,
No. 48E, p. A10, January 12, 1979.

To conclude, the appellate court intimates that its
decision is based on trial error and that the sufficiency of
the evidence would have to be tested in the new trial.
Therefore, under Burks, a new trial would not be barred.
All of the preceding cases have dealth with the problems which can arise under the traditional concepts of
former jeopardy when an appeal is taken by either party
from a prior judgment. What happens, however, if the
trial is terminated before a final judgment is reached? In
other words, the question becomes one of when jeopardy attaches for purposes of determining whether a
person has been placed in jeopardy.
Prior to Christ v. Bretz, jeopardy attached at varying
times depending upon the jurisdiction. Montana, the
jurisdiction involved in Christ, has a statute which provides that jeopardy does not attach until the first witness
is sworn. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §1711 (3) (1947). Hence,
a new trial was not barred by a termination after the
swearing of a jury but prior to the swearing of the first witness. The federal rule was that jeopardy attached upon
the swearing of a jury. Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734 (1963). In Christ, the court held that the federal
rule requiring jeopardy to attach at the time the jury is
sworn is constitutionally mandated. Therefore, the Montana statute was unconstitutional.
The only rationale provided by Justice Stewart and the
majority for holding that the federal rule of when jeopardy attaches applies to the states was as follows:
Regardless of its historic origin, however, the
defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal" is now within the protection of
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy,
since it is that "right" that lies at the foundation of the
federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is
empaneled and sworn. Christ, supra at 36.
Justice Powell eloquently dissented. He was of the
opinion that the majority failed to justify its holding that
the Fifth Amendment mandates the rule of attachment
adopted. Accordingly, the only justification by the majority was the hitherto unexplained "valued right" to a particular jury. Powell explains that the common law rule
requiring that a person's case be heard by a single jury
was a procedural rule and not part of the understanding
of former jeopardy brought to the colonies. Christ,supra
at 41. Many state courts, however, began to engraft this
rule onto the guarantee against double jeopardy contained in the federal and state constitutions. The dissent
points out that the federal courts accepted almost without articulated thought the doctrine that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against needless discharge of the
jury. To conclude, Justice Powell writes that "we should
be hesitant to constitutionalize a rule that derives no support from the Framers' understanding of English practice
from which the Double Jeopardy Clause was derived."
Christ, supra at 49.
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Although Christ settles the issue of when jeopardy will
attach in a jury trial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, it offers no standards for determining when a retrial will be barred after a mistrial. The rule established
early was that retrials would be barred unless there was a
manifest necessity for the mistrial. United States u.
Perez, 9 Wheat 579 (1924). Significant factors in determining whether there should be a retrial after mistrial are
(1) the source of difficulty (the prosecution or defendant), (2) the associated motivation (intentional harrassment), (3) the indicated prejudice to the defendant
associated with retrial and (4) the available alternatives
to mistrial. Schulhofer, Jeopardyand Mistrials 125 U.Pa.
L. Rev. 449 (1977).
Another case, Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 54
L.Ed. 2d 717, 98 S.Ct. (1978) decided February 21, 1978,
grappled with the issue of when there was manifest
necessity for a mistrial. Respondent in this case has been
granted a new trial because the prosecutor had withheld
exculpatory evidence. During opening argument of the
new trial, defense counsel made comments to the effect
that a new trial had been granted by the superior court
because of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor at
the second trial moved for a mistrial on the basis that
defense counsel's statements were inadmissable. In
granting the prosecutor's motion, the trial judge failed to
find that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial or
consider alternatives to a mistrial.
It is the conclusion of the Court that the record amply
demonstrates the need to terminate the trial because of
possible prejudice of the jurors. The trial judge was present during the trial and the decision to declare a mistrial,
because of prejudice, was a matter entirely within his discretion. Hence the Court concludes that:
The trial judge's mistrial declaration is not subject to
collateral attack simply because he failed to find
"manifest necessity" in those words or to articulate on
the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion. Arizona u. Washington,
supra at 517.
Although four doctrines were mentioned at the beginning of the article, only those confronted by the Supreme
Court this term were discussed. These cases only deal
with the first two doctrines. As in the case of the rule that
jeopardy attaches after the first juror is sworn, the other
doctrines were engrafted into the constitutional doctrine
against being placed twice in jeopardy without a great
deal of discussion as to the rationale for doing so.
Judge Charles E. Moylon would say that when one
thinks about the law of double jeopardy, that person
should think plural. There is no single law of double jeopardy, but many.

An Analysis of the
Baltimore City Police
Complaint Evaluation
Procedures
by Stephen R. Cochell
John Alan Jones
Introduction
Society entrusts the police officer with an awesome
responsibility; literally the power of life and death.
Because society grants this authority to the police
officer, it is also society's responsibility to review the
actions of the police, particularly when it comes to the
use of their ultimate weapon, the gun.
WJZ-TV 13 (Baltimore, Maryland)
Editorial Aired June 20, 1978.
Review of police misconduct by the community has
traditionally generated friction and conflict among advocates of so-called "civilian review boards" and the police
community. A number of civilian review boards have
been established in several cities across the country.
Their history of failure is mostly attributed to what has
been termed the "dilemma' of civilian review of police
misconduct. Simply stated, the pro-civilian review
groups believe that police are not responsive to the realities of their everyday lives while, on the other hand,
police are unwilling to open the processes by which their
actions are examined and potentially evaluated to those
outside the police department.
A 1969 study of police attitudes towards civilian review
revealed that two-thirds of the officers surveyed believed
that the public had a right to "pass judgment on the way
the police are doing their job." Sixty percent of the officers, however, were opposed to the mere idea of a
civilian review board even if the members were "fair and
unbiased."
While citizens wish to protect their civil liberties
against potential abuse of police authority, they also view
the police as a symbol of safety and security.
This "love-hate" relationship fosters disputes between
citizens and police which are difficult to resolve. During
the civil disorders of the late 1%0's, attention was
focused on the allegations of police brutality and other
forms of alleged police misconduct. In the wake of the
actions by the Chicago Police during the 1%8 Democratic National Convention (termed a "police riot"), a
number of cities began to search for a method to investigate allegations of police misconduct. See National Advi.
sory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission Report).

